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INFORMATION CROSSROADS: INTERSECTION

OF

MILITARY

AND

CIVILIAN INTERPRETATIONS

OF

CYBER ATTACK AND DEFENSE
I. INTRODUCTION
When the general public hears news stories about “cyberwar” or “cyber-attacks,” the image
these terms conjure up is of mass destruction to a country’s infrastructure. An example is the 2007
movie Live Free or Die Hard where a lone wolf actor is able to take control over American
electrical infrastructure, media, and even a military jet in midair.1 These kinds of “cyber-doom”
scenarios, where a keystroke destroys the lives of average citizens, bring into question the
government’s investment of billions of taxpayer dollars on kinetic defense weapons.2 But what
exactly is the current status of “cyberwar,” “cyber operations,” and “cyber defense?”
The combat domain of the twenty-first century relies on the cyber domain and
infrastructure of servers, individual computers, networks, and cyber defense operators.3 Whether
an American fifth-generation stealth fighter patrolling the Russian border with Alaska, or a lone
wolf actor looking to cause the most damage possible with a single keystroke, cyber spans the full
spectrum of combat. As a country’s infrastructure, both civilian and military, becomes more reliant
upon the benefits of cyber, it opens itself up to the vulnerability of attack by enemies abroad and
at home. On 18 June 2018, the United States Department of Defense published Joint Publication
3-12, “Cyber Operations,” to officially set forth how the United States will approach cyber defense
and conduct operations against adversaries. According to the publication, “. . . the United States
(U.S.) Department of Defense (DOD) is responsible for defending the US homeland and US

1

Michael Fottrell, Mark Bomback & David Marconi, Live Free or Die Hard (2007).
DOD Releases Fiscal Year 2020 Budget Proposal (2020),
https://comptroller.defense.gov/portals/45/documents/defbudget/fy2020/fy2020_press_release.pdf.
3
Department of Defense, Joint Publication 3-12: Cyber Operations I-1 (2018),
https://www.jcs.mil/Portals/36/Documents/Doctrine/pubs/jp3_12.pdf (last visited Dec. 1, 2020).
2

1
Published by University of Cincinnati College of Law Scholarship and Publications,

1

The University of Cincinnati Intellectual Property and Computer Law Journal, Vol. 5, Iss. 1 [], Art. 2

interests from attack, including attacks that may occur in cyberspace.”4 A Joint Publication is a
regulatory document by the Department of Defense that establishes:
fundamental principles that guide the employment of US military forces in
coordinated and integrated action toward a common objective. It promotes a
common perspective from which to plan, train, and conduct military operations. It
represents what is taught, believed, and advocated as to what is right (i.e., what
works best). It provides distilled insights and wisdom gained from employing the
military instrument of national power in operations to achieve national objectives.5
The mission of Joint Publication 3-12, Cyber Operations, creates legal challenges for two primary
reasons. First, cyber combat operations crosses sovereign boundaries, unlike any other kinetic
weapon.6 Second, cyber can operate domestically where the DOD has limited ability to respond to
threats due to laws such as posse comitatus, which is the use of federal active-duty troops in a
civilian law enforcement capacity.7
The DOD considers cyber an important enough domain to create a combatant command
just to counter threats within the domain.8 A combatant command is an organization that takes
units from all branches of the US military and directs missions using these joint forces in
furtherance of a national interest in that region or domain. 9 An example is the nuclear domain
under the control of US Strategic Command (USSTRATCOM).10 Traditionally, combatant
commands are geographic, coordinating joint forces from all the branches of the US Military to
conduct operations throughout the globe, the exceptions being USSTRATCOM and US Special

4

Cyberspace Operations, Department of Defense, Joint Publication 3-12: Cyber Operations I-1 (2018),
https://www.jcs.mil/portals/36/documents/doctrine/pubs/jp3_12.pdf.
5
Joint Doctrine Publications, Joint Chiefs of Staff, https://www.jcs.mil/doctrine/joint-doctinepubs/#:~:text=joint%20doctrine%20pubs,joint%20doctrine%20publications,train%2c%20and%20conduct%20military%20operations (last visited Dec. 1,
2020).
6
Id. at 1-2.
7
Use of Army and Air Force as Posse Comitatus, 18 U.S. Code § 1385 (1878).
8
Joint Publication 3-12, at I-2.
9
Combatant Commands, United States Department of Defense Combatant Commands,
https://www.defense.gov/our-story/combatant-commands/ (last visited Oct. 5, 2020).
10
Joint Publication 1-02, Department of Defense Dictionary of Military and Associated Terms, A-190
https://fas.org/irp/doddir/dod/jp1_02.pdf (last visited Oct. 5, 2020).
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Operations Command (USSOCOM).11 United States Cyber Command (USCYBERCOM) has
existed in some form since the 1990s. In August 2017, President Trump, under the direction of
then Secretary of Defense James Mattis, officially directed the creation of USCYBERCOM as a
combatant command.12 With an established combatant command, the US military believes that it
can now properly coordinate its cyber forces from all of its branches and further the goal to “defend
the US homeland and US interests from attack.”13
II. BACKGROUND
Joint Publication 3-12 (3-12) covers a myriad of operational capabilities and procedures
for the US to conduct cyber operations. However, 3-12 appears to lack legal support for these
operations. Understandably, the Joint Chiefs of Staff signed 3-12 over two years ago, yet the words
regarding the conduct of cyber operations state:
DOD conducts Cyberspace Operations (CO) consistent with US domestic law, applicable
international law, and relevant USG and DOD policies. The laws that regulate military
actions in US territory also apply to cyberspace. Therefore, DOD cyberspace forces that
operate outside the Department of Defense Information Network (DODIN), when properly
authorized, are generally limited to operating in gray and red cyberspace only, unless they
are issued different rules of engagement or conducting defense support of civil authorities
(DSCA) under appropriate authority.14
The legal support section goes on to say: “[s]ince each CO mission has unique legal considerations,
the applicable legal framework depends on the nature of the activities to be conducted.”15
Nevertheless, the US government bases its ability to conduct Cyber Operations at home
and abroad on the Constitution of the United States and Titles 6, 10, 18, 28, 32, 40, 44, and 50 of

11

Id.
U.S. Cyber Command History, U.S. Cyber Command, https://www.cybercom.mil/about/history, (last visited Nov.
25, 2020).
13
Cyberspace Operations, Department of Defense, Joint Publication 3-12: Cyber Operations I-1 (2018)
https://www.jcs.mil/portals/36/documents/doctrine/pubs/jp3_12.pdf (last visited Dec. 1, 2020).
14
Id. at III-11.
15
Id.
12
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the United States Code (U.S.C.).16 Essentially, the DOD and other agencies tasked with
cybersecurity have the power to conduct cyber operations only through Titles 6, 10, 18, 32, and
50. Title 6 deals with domestic security, specifically the role that the Department of Homeland
Security plays within the operation of the cyber domain regarding national security. 17 The
Department of Homeland Security (DHS) is responsible for securing the nation’s domestic
cyberspace.18 DHS and DOD rely upon each other to assist in the cyber defense of the nation. DHS
relies upon the assistance of DOD cyber capabilities. On the other hand, the DOD relies on DHS
because DOD is limited in its ability to conduct domestic operations, particularly dealing with law
enforcement, barring national emergencies such as insurrections.19 DHS’s primary focus is in
countering attacks, protecting non-DOD governmental networks, preventing intrusions, and
establishing relations with the private sector in support of national cybersecurity.20 Furthermore,
DHS partners with the Department of Justice (DOJ), specifically the Federal Bureau of
Investigation (FBI), to provide the information that the DOJ needs for conducting law enforcement
investigations and the operations to ensure domestic cybersecurity.21
The federal government criminalized cybercrimes through 18 U.S.C. 1030, also known as
the Computer Fraud and Abuse Act of 1986.22 Currently, 18 U.S.C. 1030(a) states the definitions
of cybercrimes:
(1) Knowingly accessing a computer without authorization or exceeding authorization
(2) Obtaining— (A) information contained in a financial record of a financial institution,
or of a card issuer; (B) information from any department or agency of the United States; or
(C) information from any protected computer;
16

Id. at III-2.
Id.
18
Id.
19
Id at III-10.
20
Id.
21
Id at III-11.
22
Charles Doyle, Cybercrime: A Sketch Of 18 U.S.C. 1030 And Related Federal Criminal Laws,
https://fas.org/sgp/crs/misc/rs20830.pdf (last visited Dec. 1, 2020).
17
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(3) intentionally, without authorization to access any nonpublic computer of a department
or agency of the United States;
(4) knowingly accessing a computer or network with intent to defraud;
(5) intentionally or recklessly cause damage to a network via installation of programs or
through invasion of the network;
(6) inhibit the traffic of communication with the intent to defraud;
(7) extortion.23
Notably, there are no provisions for cyber terrorism or cyberattacks by foreign entities. 24 Such
crimes fall under the law of war and DOD enforcement while the Computer Fraud and the Abuse
Act of 1986 concern what DHS and DOJ are targeting at home.25
Further, DOD’s role in cyber under Title 10 is to “man, train and equip US forces for
military operations in cyberspace.”26 From the Secretary of Defense to individual soldiers assigned
to a cyber specialty in their respective service, every member of the organization has a
responsibility to ensure the mission of safeguarding US information networks.27 Individuals within
this cyberinfrastructure man their posts against would-be attackers, whether they be agents of nearpeer competitors, such as China and Russia, or dispersed agents of terrorist networks, such as
Daesh, conducting information warfare via social media against the US, its allies, and their
interests.28
A notable responsibility under Joint Publication 3-12, USCYBERCOM is the sole
authority to conduct cyber operations and actions that impact other sovereign nations.29 As such,

23

Id.
Id.
25
Id.
26
Joint Publication 3-12 at III-3.
27
Id.
28
Id at III-1.
29
Id at III-5.
24
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geographic combatant commands must relegate themselves to a supporting role for
USCYBERCOM assets to conduct operations in the area.30 The sharing of responsibilities between
geographic combatant commands and USCYBERCOM poses issues with cybersecurity. First,
unlike standard units, cyber units can see “digital weapons” and these “digital weapons” have the
power to create kinetic effects that are often non-attributable.31Second, affected nations can take
action against conventional forces in the combatant command’s geographical theater in response
to the cyber-attacks, even though the operation is most likely from the US mainland.32 This means
that an operation may start as a cyber-operation but transition into requiring physical forces and
physical attacks in order to achieve mission objectives.
Why is all this law and military infrastructure necessary? In short, why is the cyber domain
slowly taking a spotlight in a DOD budget in which large kinetic weapons like aircraft carriers,
tanks, and stealth bombers normally dominate? The fear of having years of technological
development and billions of dollars spent in achieving military superiority just to see it disappear
via cyber-attack powers the DOD’s cyberwar machine.33 The DOD is afraid that even with all its
spending on the latest kinetic weaponry it is still vulnerable to adversaries knocking out entire
battlefleets with one keystroke, or shutting down the nation’s power grid at the click of a mouse.34
The United States’ main concern in cyber is what Professor Sean Lawson describes as a “cyber
Pearl Harbor” or a “cyber 9/11” in his book Cybersecurity Discourse in the United States CyberDoom Rhetoric and Beyond.35 Professor Lawson and the DOD agree that cyber has the ability to

30

Id.
Id.
32
Id.
33
Sean Lawson, Cybersecurity Discourse in the United States Cyber-Doom Rhetoric and Beyond, 13 (Mark Lacy &
Dan Prince Eds., 2020).
34
Id. at 61.
35
Sean Lawson, Cybersecurity Discourse in the United States Cyber-Doom Rhetoric and Beyond, 5 (Mark Lacy &
Dan Prince Eds., 2020).
31
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cause terrible damage to the United States. However, Lawson takes a different approach from the
DOD and argues that the military’s view on cyber is filled with “cyber-doom” rhetoric better suited
for the movie theater than the Pentagon.36 Criticism of the DOD’s rhetoric stems from two primary
camps. First, Lawson notes “the official narrative about who threatens what, how, and with what
potential impact shifted over time, but it has done so with very little evidence provided to support
the claims being made, thus raising the possibility that cyber threats are a mere fiction.”37 Second,
other critics state that “think tanks, security firms, defense contractors, and government leaders
who trumpet the problem of cyberattacks as self-interested ideologues who promote unrealistic
portrayals of cyber threats for the financial benefit of an emerging ‘cyber-industrial complex.’”38
III. CHALLENGES TO CONVENTIONAL COMBAT DOCTRINE IN THE CYBER REALM
A. SOVEREIGNTY
The US military maintains a vigilant presence over America’s interest at home and abroad
in a myriad of domains that are tangible and understandable to the American citizen such as air,
land, and sea. Jane and Joe Doe can understand or at least visualize what they see on CNN when
an aircraft enters foreign airspace, or a Special Forces team conducts an operation in another land.
Both of those operations fall within the traditional interpretation of invading another nation’s
sovereignty. Yet, where does a nation’s cyberinfrastructure stand regarding sovereignty? Does
accessing the aircraft database of Ramstein Air Base from a terminal in Moscow constitute a
violation of American sovereignty in the same way a Russian Spetsnaz unit physically on the
ground taking pictures of the same information violates American sovereignty? In a 2009 Air
Force Law Review article, Lieutenant Colonel Patrick W. Franzese writes, “[w]hile not every

36

Id. at 17.
Id.
38
Id.
37

7
Published by University of Cincinnati College of Law Scholarship and Publications,

7

The University of Cincinnati Intellectual Property and Computer Law Journal, Vol. 5, Iss. 1 [], Art. 2

violation of sovereignty will necessarily result in the use of force, state practice evidences that a
state can use force to defend its sovereignty.”39 Colonel Franzese collected data evidencing that in
2008, the Pentagon’s network saw over six million cyber-attacks, most of which were by
individuals trying to gain access to delicate information such as e-mails and Congressional
computer access points.40 Yet, the US is not the only target of cyberattacks. Sovereign nations
around the world see attacks in the millions as well, often going past simple information gathering
and causing harm on par with kinetic attacks.41 Estonia, Georgia, and Kyrgyzstan were subjected
to cyberattacks that significantly affected Internet service in their banking, governmental, and
communication infrastructure in their countries.42 In Estonia, observers identified that “[t]he main
targets were: the Estonian presidency and its parliament; almost all of the country’s government
ministries; political parties; three of the country’s six big news organizations; two of the biggest
banks; and firms specializing in communications.”43 These targets are not random; they are critical
to a nation’s political, economic and communication infrastructure. By weakening these points, an
adversary opens the way for additional attacks, whether digital or kinetic.
Sovereignty is a critical component of the cyber warfare equation because sovereignty is
one of the highest held beliefs of the United Nations Charter.44 The United Nations Charter
establishes guiding principles and ideas that nations that wish to be part of the organization and
work alongside other members must adhere to. Article 2(1) of the United Nations Charter states,

39

Patrick W. Franzese, Sovereignty in Cyberspace: Can It Exist, 64, Air Force Law Review (2009),
https://www.afjag.af.mil/portals/77/documents/afd-091026-024.pdf.
40
Id. at 2.
41
Sean Lawson, Cybersecurity Discourse in The United States Cyber-Doom Rhetoric and Beyond, 25 (Mark Lacy &
Dan Prince Eds., 2020).
42
Id.
43
Id.
44
The Judge Advocate General’s Legal Center and School International and Operational Law Department, Law of
Armed Conflict Documentary Supplement, 1 (2013).
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“[t]he Organization is based on the principle of the sovereign equality of all its Members.” 45 To
protect that valued sovereignty, the Charter explicitly requests in Article 2(4) that members refrain
from the threat or use of force to resolve conflicts.46 In the aforementioned attacks in Estonia and
the US, do cyberattacks fall under this violation of the charter? Specifically, does it constitute use
of force under Article 2(4), or an “armed attack” under Article 51 of the Charter allowing the
victim of the attack to defend itself proportionally?47 The answer is not as simple as traditional
kinetic attacks. That is why scientists, legal scholars, and military generals are constantly trying to
figure out where the line, if any, exists with cyberattacks. A disproportionate reaction to a
cyberattack in the form of a kinetic response can create a domino effect where a temporary
connection lag spike leads to flag-draped coffins carried out of cargo planes.
Critics of cyberattacks being on par with kinetic weapons argue that placing cyber weapons
on par with their kinetic weapons involves flawed reasoning.48 Thus, critics state that to place
cyber weapons on equal footing with kinetic weapons is based on exaggerated cyber-doom
capabilities.49 Professors Jeffrey Biller and Michael Schmitt, in their 2019 legal analysis titled
“Classification of Cyber Capabilities and Operations as Weapons, Means, or Methods of Warfare,”
concurred with Professor Thomas Rid’s critical view of categorizing cyber-weapons on par with
kinetic weapons.50 The scholars fault the poor use of analogies by governmental organizations and
conclude that “cyber capabilities cannot logically be categorized as weapons or means of cyber
warfare.”51

45

Id.
Id.
47
“Nothing in The Present Charter Shall Impair the Inherent Right of Individual or Collective Self-Defense If an
Armed Attack Occurs Against A Member of The United Nations, Until the Security Council Has Taken Measures
Necessary to Maintain International Peace and Security.” Id. at 7.
48
Lawson at 140.
49
Id.
50
Id.
51
Id.
46
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Nonetheless, in 2009, the international community viewed the US and Israeli cyber units’
use of the Stuxnet virus to disrupt Iranian nuclear production as the use of a weapon.52
Conventional American and Israeli units trained and equipped for cyber warfare were eventually
credited with the Stuxnet attack, and it achieved its mission to physically harm Iranian centrifuges
that aided in the uranium enrichment process.53 Hypothetically, an operation could carry the same
results if a stealth bomber, or a Special Forces team conducts it; however, because it involved
combat cyber capabilities, the ability to initially attribute the attack and determine its source and
breach of sovereignty flirted along the delicate line of an “armed attack.”54 Stuxnet is an outlier in
this regard. Most acts of cyber-sabotage to date have been non-violent, harming neither machines
nor human beings.55
The polarized opinions regarding cyberattacks and their impacts are not limited to political
scholars. There is an ongoing debate between entrenched camps of whether cyber-attacks are
“armed attacks.56 To attempt to bridge the divide between these ideas, the DOD places military
cyber capabilities as an instrument that is dependent on the domains of air, land, sea, and space to
conduct its operations.57 Under this theory, DOD is able to appease those in the camp that believe
that cyberattacks can only be “armed attacks” when accompanied by “real world” military acts by
conducting these joint operations.58 On the other hand, cyber’s ability to permeate through all the
domains also gives it the ability to harm through all domains, cause harm regardless of the original
platform for an attack, and allow it to remain independent of conventional systems.59 The one thing

52

Id. at 60.
Id. at 113.
54
Law of Armed Conflict Supplement at 7.
55
Lawson at 114.
56
Franzese at 6.
57
Joint Publication 3-12 at 1-2.
58
Id.
59
Franzese at 6.
53
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on which scholars can agree is that cyber has outpaced the current legal capabilities to understand
and control the potential for cyber operations.60
Does the idea that States maintain sovereignty in the digital realm hold true as much as
physical borders? One camp of theorists states that cyberspace should be free from government
interference or sovereignty.

61

Such an argument suggests that cyberspace is immune from state

sovereignty due to its interconnected and cross-border features.62 On the other hand, Lt. Col.
Franzese explores the idea that there are four reasons why States cannot separate sovereignty from
the digital domain. First, although the digital domain does not have a physical embodiment or
location, the servers and infrastructure supporting it are within a State’s borders. 63 Second, States
maintain financial control over corporations or organizations that maintain the support system for
cyberspace.64 Third, States have an interest in the content shared through cyberspace. From child
pornography to communication of radical ideas such as Daesh’s newsletter, a State has an interest
in monitoring the data processed through cyberspace.65 Fourth, cyberspace has slowly forced
States to have a presence in the domain.66 The current use of telecommuting resulting from the
COVID-19 pandemic demonstrates this exact issue. The US military saw most, if not all, of their
non-operational activities moved to the cyber domain.67 For example, organizations held important
meetings discussing everything from aircraft maintenance status to courts-martial over home
networks with rushed protection methods in place.

60

Id.
Id. at 9.
62
Id. at 12.
63
Id.
64
Id.
65
Id. at 13.
66
Id.
67
Defense Department CIO and Joint Staff CIO Brief Reporters on DOD Communication Efforts Regarding
COVID-19, https://www.defense.gov/newsroom/transcripts/transcript/article/2147989/defense-department-cio-andjoint-staff-cio-brief-reporters-on-dod-communication/#skip-target (last visited Dec. 1, 2020).
61
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The difficulty of establishing cyber sovereignty is not lost on States. Just recently, during
the twentieth century, States had to adapt to two new domains in air and space. Fears about the
catastrophic consequences that could come from allowing the domains to be unregulated led the
States to come together and identify where the line should be to protect their sovereignty and own
survival.68 Cyber should be no different. Even as there is criticism towards the cyber-doom
rhetoric, States and their militaries must take cyber seriously and understand that cyberspace and
a country’s sovereignty are no longer independent. Much like how countries learned to live under
the constant threat of a nuclear umbrella and mutually assured destruction, States must strike a
delicate balance to maintain sovereignty while not destroying its ability to communicate and trade
with other States.69
2. ARMED ATTACKS
Article 49(1) of Additional Protocol I to the Geneva Convention of 1949 defines an “armed
attack” as “acts of violence against an adversary, whether in offense or defense.”70 Article 49(3)
clarifies the application of attack to mean “air, land or sea warfare.”71 After its ratification and
signature by over 173 States in 1977, Additional Protocol I (AP I) attempted to expand on the
foundation of the Geneva Conventions from three decades prior in an effort to adapt to an everchanging world.72 However, the signatory States could not have predicted the development and
revolution that the internet and cyber would bring to the world. 73 AP I’s definition of where an
armed attack applies remains a binding source of international law at least for those States that are

68

For example, see Treaty on Principles Governing the Activities of States in the Exploration and Use of Outer
Space, Including the Moon and Other Celestial Bodies, https://www.unoosa.orgoosa, (last visited Dec. 1, 2020),
archived at https://www.unoosa.org/oosa/en/ourwork/spacelaw/treaties/introouterspacetreaty.html.
69
Franzese at 40.
70
Jag School Law of Armed Conflict Documentary Supplement at 210.
71
Id.
72
Id. at 197.
73
Id.
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part of the convention.74 For this reason, even with the advances in DOD’s shift to cyber, the
unknowns surrounding how to conduct such operations and respond to “cyberattacks” strictly
within the cyber domain can scare off funding for more tangible purchases. However, near-peer
competitors see this and contrast it with the US’s dependence on cyber as a weakness in the US
military’s armor, because although the capabilities to respond to a cyberattack are there, the legal
framework to guide such response is underdeveloped.75
Today, cyberspace is a realm that transcends international boundaries at the speed of light,
and as Major Graham Todd notes in his Air Force Law Review article, Armed Attack in
Cyberspace: Deterring Asymmetric Warfare with an Asymmetric Definition, “unfortunately, law,
especially international law, failed to keep pace with the new applications of existing
technologies.”76 Maj. Todd further states that “the legal world is being held back by its nuances of
wordplay and definitions and allowing technology to dictate the tempo of the law and forcing the
community try and fit square pegs in round holes when presented with suspected cyberattacks.”77
Maj. Todd identifies key differences between cyberattacks and traditional kinetic attacks. First,
computer networks are a new target category, with computer network attacks capable of providing
the same results as striking the traditional target with a kinetic weapon.78 Second, an attack does
not have to use kinetic force and can solely involve a command from one computer to the target
system.79 Third, the intended results are often not kinetic and could simply involve the
manipulation of data or disruption of service.80 Fourth, cyberspace threats are not constrained by

74

Id.
Graham H. Todd, Armed Attack in Cyberspace: Deterring Asymmetric Warfare with An Asymmetric Definition,
66 (2009).
76
Id.
77
Id.
78
Id. at 68.
79
Id.
80
Id.
75
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political boundaries or geography.81 Fifth, cyberspace attacks can be completed literally at the
speed of light.82 Sixth, the results of some cyberspace attacks, whether intended or not, can be
similar to those involving weapons of mass destruction and the cost of acquiring the equipment
and expertise to conduct operations in cyberspace is de minimis in comparison to fielding
conventional forces.83 Finally, attributing the attack to the responsible party and determining
whether the attack was intentional or accidental is extremely difficult. 84
From these concepts, the most difficult to consolidate with traditional notions of attack is
the last point of attribution.85 When Maj. Todd wrote his article, the difficulty of attribution was
present but not as pervasive as it is today. Today, terrorists and State-sponsored cyber forces can
rely on cheap Virtual Private Networks, servers located in sovereign territory on the other side of
the globe from their insertion point, and training that is becoming easily and economically
available to more citizens each day. One just needs to look at the proliferation of smartphones and
their capabilities since 2009. However, Maj. Todd’s approach is still viable and resonates with
firmly held legal beliefs such as negligence and assault.86
The analysis breaks down into two questions. First, was a cyber weapon used against the
property or persons of a State?87 Second, did a foreign state knowingly allow an entity under its
legal control to use the cyber weapon?88 Answering these questions raises the additional question
of what exactly qualifies as a cyber weapon. The military tries to define “cyber weapon” by using
the civilian definition in 18 U.S.C. 1030.89 The statute defines a cyber weapon based on its ability

81

Id.
Id.
83
Id.
84
Id.
85
Id. at 69.
86
Id. at 93-94.
87
Id.
88
Id.
89
Id. at 84.
82
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to create cyber “damage” or an “impairment to the integrity of data, a program, a system or
information.”90 Legal ambiguity in this definition appears to be the perfect counter to cyber’s
ability to be unpredictable and ever evolving. Maj. Todd’s approach focuses on an offensive rather
than a defensive tool.91 His approach provides the victim of a cyber-attack a more lenient analysis,
allowing the victim to retaliate with a stronger legal foundation.

92

Additionally, Maj. Todd’s

definition forces actors wishing to conduct cyberattacks to consider their use by placing them in a
more vulnerable situation, leaving them with fewer options to criticize legally supported counter
attacks.93
Major Todd’s two-part cyber-attack definition, though helpful to States in defining a cyberattack, nonetheless establishes a dangerous scenario where a cyber-attack can open the door for a
kinetic counterattack.94 Article 51 of the United Nations charter states that a nation still holds its
right to self-defense.95 Part of that right is a nation’s ability to counterattack by whatever means it
deem proportional to the attack.96 Consider the Stuxnet attack on Iranian centrifuges: under the
proposed definition, the US and Israel both knowingly allowed agents under their command to
conduct an operation that impaired a system of information, causing physical damage.97 Thus, Iran
could theoretically consider this an armed attack and respond in kind by destroying a target with
force proportional to that used, in which case a bomb may fit the bill. The cyber domain and the
legal domain are two worlds muddled in their intricacies and ever-changing nature. However, as
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one evolves so must the other, and currently, the law is needing to play catch up with the cyber
domain.
3. CURRENT DIRECTIVE ON APPLICATION OF CYBER-WEAPONS BY US MILITARY
UNITS
Under the two directives of how the United States defines weapons, the use of “Cyberweapon” as a term is currently incorrect.98 Department of Defense Directive 3000.03E states that
Non-Lethal Weapons “are explicitly designed and primarily employed to incapacitate personnel
or materiel immediately, while minimizing fatalities, permanent injury to personnel, and undesired
damage to property, facilities, materiel, and the environment.”99 The directive further goes on to
say that it does not apply to “[i]nformation operations, cyber operations, or any other military
capability not explicitly designed and primarily employed to incapacitate personnel or materiel
immediately, while minimizing fatalities, permanent injury, and undesirable damage to property,
facilities, materiel, and the environment, even though they may have these effects to some
extent.”100 Under this definition and limitation, the use of cyber technologies to attack or defend
does not equate to using a weapon. So, what does the military consider cyber if not a weapon?
Department of Defense Directive 3600.01, Information Operations states that cyber
technology is a “capability.”101 DOD Directive 3600.01 describes the use of cyber technology as
the “principal mechanism used during military operations to integrate, synchronize, employ, and
assess a wide variety of information-related capabilities (IRCs) in concert with other lines of
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operations to effect adversaries’ or potential adversaries’ decision making while protecting our
own.”102 The directive defines what the purpose of cyber capabilities are, but the actual process of
employing them is much more complex, even in comparison to ordering the drop of a conventional
bomb. In 2016, Mr. James E. McGee, then legal advisor for United States Special Operations
Command North, published an article titled Liberating Cyber Offense.103 In his article, McGee
describes the fundamental pathway that the US military takes when undertaking offensive
operations using cyber capabilities.104 In comparison to its kinetic brethren, cyber operations
against a non-DOD network require a much higher level of approval, usually starting at the
Secretary of Defense.105
Furthermore, McGee elaborates that in order to execute a cyber operation, a combatant or
regional commander must have either an execute order (EXORD) already in place for conducting
cyber operations against that specific target from the Secretary of Defense, or route the request
through the review and approval process for cyber operations (RAPCO).106 The RAPCO process
is usually mired in bureaucracy and interagency procedures that stymie the operation and usually
force the commander into opting for their kinetic assets which in turn end up risking actual lives
and equipment.107 Even if an EXORD is in place, and it is coupled with valid rules of engagement,
there are still requirements for processing authorization for the cyber operations, getting actual
target approval, and deconflicting the area of operation with other assets, which takes more time
than conventional kinetic operations.108
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Additionally, Joint Publication 3-60, Targeting, Section A(2)(3) limits the use of cyber
capabilities when targeting suspected enemies.109 Specifically, the issue with targeting in the cyber
domain is determining how far the damage can extend and in turn the harm it can cause to civilians
as collateral damage.110 McGee states:
[I]n assessing incidental injury or damage, remote harms and lesser forms of harm—such
as mere inconveniences or temporary losses—need not be considered in applying the
proportionality rule. In the case of a power plant supporting civilian infrastructure, this can
mean outlining effects against unintended targets, including hospitals, religious sites,
orphanages, or other places that might be on a restricted or no-strike target list.111
Furthermore, the United States has taken Professor Harold Koh’s concepts during his
speech at the 2012 CYBERCOM legal conference and codified them as part of their law of war
manual.112 Professor Koh stated that cyber operations can be considered “armed attacks” under the
UN Charter Article 2(4), which states, “[i]f the physical consequences of a cyber-attack work the
kind of physical damage that dropping a bomb or firing a missile would, that cyber-attack should
equally be considered a use of force.”113 It is within this realm of contradiction that cyber
capabilities dwell. Not quite a weapon, yet still in the realm of an armed attack; safer and
theoretically easier to use, yet much more complicated to employ in combat.114
IV. CURRENT CHALLENGES TO CYBERSECURITY
A. CONSOLIDATING DOMESTIC INFORMATION SHARING AND HOMELAND
DEFENSE
In the event of cyberattacks and actual cyber conflict, the true casualties will not be the
cyber operators at the front lines of DOD’s fight, but the individual American citizen. 2014 saw
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attacks against private civilian companies such as Target, eBay, Home Depot, J.P. Morgan Chase,
Sony Pictures, and Anthem.115 Further investigation into these attacks and additional breaches in
2015 divulged that over 43% of American corporations had been victims of cyberattacks in one
form or another.116 These companies are seeing sophisticated attacks on par with those that the
military faces from its near-peer competitors.117 The close ties between the private and public
sectors in America make it so that an attack against a civilian company can have far-reaching
effects on its defense industry. One such example is the 2015 data breach of defense contractor
Lockheed-Martin.118 Lockheed provides the United States military with hundreds of weapon
systems, most notably for the 2015 hack are the F-22 and F-35 fighter jets.119 These two aircraft
are the only true fifth-generation stealth fighters in the world, and have capabilities that the US
relies on to achieve air dominance over any adversary.120 The 2015 hack saw information regarding
these aircraft transferred to an unknown source, but most defense experts believe Chinese cyber
operators or Chinese sponsored actors are responsible.121 The primary evidence behind suspicion
of Chinese interference is the resemblance of China’s newest J-20 fighter to the F-22 and F-35 as
well as the rapid improvements to J-20 from prior to the attack.122
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The interdependent nature of the federal government’s defense infrastructure and the
civilian corporate market makes the sharing of information and experiences between them
regarding cyberattacks vital for mutual survival.123 Current cyber information sharing has three
lines of attack: dissemination of information from the federal government to private entities,
dissemination among the private entities, and transfer of information from private entities to the
federal government.124 Although the methods share similarities, they have different challenges
regarding legal frameworks and technical difficulties such as differing security clearances for
forwarding information.125
1. SHARING INFORMATION FROM THE FEDERAL GOVERNMENT TO PRIVATE
ENTITIES.
The federal government’s infrastructure relating to the receipt and compiling of
information regarding cyber-attacks and capabilities is robust and has the most legal clarity
regarding roles and responsibilities.126 The Department of Homeland Security’s Office of
Intelligence and Analysis (I&A), is an entity under Section 201 of the Homeland Security Act of
2002.127 I&A is empowered to “access and receive” information and intelligence from agencies of
government at all levels, state and federal, as well as from private actors.128 I&A’s principal
mission is to “identify and assess […] terrorist threats to the homeland […] and actual and potential
vulnerabilities to the homeland.”129 The second step of I&A’s mission is to gather all of the
information relating to the suspected attack, process it, and disseminate it to agencies of the federal

123

Andrew Nolan, Cybersecurity and Information Sharing: Legal Challenges and Solutions, 3,
https://kmjas.jag.af.mil/moodle/pluginfile.php/32853/mod_resource/content/2/crs__cybersecurity_and_information_sharing_legal_challenges.pdf.
124
Id. at 5.
125
Id. at 5-6.
126
Id. at 7.
127
Id.
128
Id.
129
Id.

20
https://scholarship.law.uc.edu/ipclj/vol5/iss1/2

20

Plazas: Information Crossroads: Intersection of Military and Civilian Int

and state governments as well as private entities.130 A division of the National Plans and Programs
directorate known as the National Cybersecurity and Communication Integration Center (NCCIC
or Center) further supports I&A’s role.131 Where I&A’s role is primarily to analyze and warn
through information provided to it, NCCIC monitors traffic 24/7 to warn organizations, public and
private, of threats to their infrastructure or about attacks going on against similar actors.132
Congress codified NCCIC’s functions to include: “serving as an ‘interface’ for the ‘real-time’
‘sharing of information related to cybersecurity risks, incidents, analysis, and warnings between
Federal and non-Federal entities.’”133
As strong as I&A and NCCIC’s security infrastructure appears, its power and that of DHS
is not limitless. First, for the government to provide a private entity information regarding threats
in the cyber domain, it must generally do so voluntarily as directed by 6 U.S.C. §143(1) and
§121(d)(6)-(8).134 Under current law, DHS is limited to this voluntary exchange of information
between the private sector and the government, which raises the question of its effectiveness
relying solely on voluntary reports.135 The statute, 6 U.S.C. §121(d)(11) states that information in
DHS’s possession “is protected from unauthorized disclosure and handled and used only for the
performance of official duties.”136 This means that unless the organization deems it an official duty
to disclose the information to private parties, then it will remain with DHS, thus hindering the
ability for the government and private entities to coordinate cyber-defense actions.
2. SHARING INFORMATION FROM PRIVATE ENTITIES TO THE FEDERAL
GOVERNMENT
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Homeland cyber-defense is the US government’s responsibility through DOD and DHS.137
However, one cannot overlook the interconnected nature of the private entities with the
government, and the impact that a cyber-attack on private organizations can have on the federal
government. Currently, private organizations can transfer information relating to cyber-attacks and
threats voluntarily to DHS.138 In theory, this process is good, but legally there are underlying
private concerns for organizations relating to dealing with the government.139 First, when a
company transfers information from its database to one that is controlled by the federal
government, the information is accessible through a Freedom of Information Act request, which
may divulge information that the company may not want competitors, investors, or the media to
see.140
Additionally, by sharing information with the government, private organizations risk the
security of their intellectual property. After sharing cyber-intelligence with the government, there
is a presumption that a company waives its intellectual property rights associated with the
information due to the voluntary disclosure.141 There is a difficult balance in this realm between
the law of trade secrets, which aims to secure a company’s place in the hierarchy through the
collection of information and technological development to achieve a competitive advantage, and
a company’s desire to maintain security in the organization.142 In other words, by trying to protect
themselves from cyber-attacks, by sharing cyber-information with the government, private
companies are risking key tenets of intellectual property information protection.143 The disclosure
demonstrates that the company (1) has destroyed the independent value because the information
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is now generally known and (2) is no longer the subject of the company’s efforts to maintain the
information’s secrecy.144
3. RECONCILING CONCERNS AND DIFFICULTIES THROUGH FEDERAL LAW
In his 2015 article, “Cybersecurity and Information Sharing: Legal Challenges and
Solutions,” Mr. Andrew Nolan proposes a solution to the sharing of cybersecurity information
between entities by breaking down the bureaucracy of the government’s approach to cybersecurity into three distinct areas.145 He proposes creating a stronger legislative body of law aside
from the Homeland Security Act and tackling the cyber-information by identifying what type of
information the government should receive, who can receive the information, and proper use for
the information.146 The issue with the proposals is finding the balance between information
gathering, government involvement, and government use.147 If the scope of the legislation is too
broad, the amount of information may be too much for the government to process, and the
government may overlook actual threats to the nation’s cyber-infrastructure.148 On the other hand,
if the scope is too narrow, then there may be insufficient evidence to pinpoint the attack’s target
and method of harm.149 The difficulty in identifying the correct intercept between the private and
public sectors is most apparent in the realm of liability.150 A company may be acting in its and the
nation’s best interests by providing cyber-information to the government. However, if DHS, and
perhaps even DOD, find evidence of federal and state law violations by the company when
reviewing the information, questions may arise about who is at fault and why a private entity is
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facing charges for doing their part in homeland defense.151 The answers to such questions were
not clear in 2015 when Nolan wrote the article. However, Nolan best describes the interplay by
stating: “without some assurances with regard to liability, the potential exists that a private entity
may simply refuse to participate in information sharing, reasoning that any amorphous benefits
that could be realized would simply not cover the cost of liability.”152
B. FUTURE OF CYBERSECURITY LEGISLATION
Senior Specialist in Science and Technology, Eric Fischer, wrote his 2013 article, “Federal
Laws Relating to Cybersecurity: Overview and Discussion of Proposed Revisions” in hopes of
identifying how to reconcile the amorphous, and dispersed nature of cybersecurity with a more
centralized and focused approach of federal legislation.153 Fischer studied ten broad areas Congress
explored to improve the cybersecurity infrastructure of the government. 154 Fischer states four
areas of focus out of his ten that demonstrate the intersection of private and public interest:
“national strategy and the role of government, protection of critical infrastructure (including the
electricity grid and the chemical industry), cross-sector coordination, and international efforts.”155
As such, their regulatory framework is in the direst need of clarification to bring forth the most
effective and legal cyber protection enterprise.156 Fischer specifically recommended the legislature
tackle these issues by amending already existing regulations to the cyber domain.157
1. NATIONAL STRATEGY AND ROLE OF GOVERNMENT AND PROTECTION OF
CRITICAL INFRASTRUCTURE
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The thought that a law from the mid-nineteenth century influences the government’s role
in cybersecurity may be unfathomable. The underlying principles of some of these statutes still
have the effect of restricting the capabilities of the government to properly handle cybersecurity
issues, in short proving the government with nineteenth-century tools to handle twenty-firstcentury problems.158 The main legislation regarding military law enforcement of civilian issues is
the Posse Comitatus Act of 1879 (18 U.S.C. § 1385), which “restricts the use of military forces in
civilian law enforcement within the United States, unless it is within a federal government
facility.”159 Violations of the Act involve the direct use of military forces; additionally, the use of
military force is “pervasive” in the civilian law enforcement operation.160Advocates for revision
of the Act state that the Act’s language in turn binds the hands of DOD in implementing its
technology and intelligence on foreign actors in support of civilian law enforcement.161
Furthermore, as cyber-attacks have the ability to permeate between interconnected networks, what
may start as a criminal attack on civilian organizations may turn into an issue of national
defense.162 A strict interpretation of the Act would lead to two separate, uncoordinated
investigations that may hinder the abilities of civilian and military cyber-defense.163 The spirit of
the Act is to prevent the image of active-duty military troops in civilian cities.164 As such, the
proposed amendments are mostly aimed at allowing remote assistance through clarifying when the
U.S. military can operate domestically regarding cyber threats to the information infrastructure,
most of which is privately owned.165
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In addition, the National Security Act of 1947 (50 U.S.C. 401) created the National
Security Council, the Central Intelligence Agency, and the procedures for access to classified
information.166 The reason the Act is important is that most cybersecurity and cyber-defense issues
that involve the federal government require a security clearance.167 Security clearances are a
significant barrier to improving cybersecurity sharing of information regarding cyber-attacks.168
In the past, Congress has attempted to pass legislation facilitating the transfer of information
between civilian and military cyber-security enterprises.169 As private firms augment the military
in this regard, it would make sense to amend the Act to allow for more efficient communications,
strengthening overall cyber-defense.170
2. CROSS-SECTOR COORDINATION AND INTERNATIONAL EFFORTS
Congress has also looked outside the federal government and its abilities to augment
national cyber-defense with private industry and international partners.171 First, Congress has
looked at possible updates to the Freedom of Information Act (FOIA, 5 U.S.C. § 552).172 FOIA
allows private individuals and organizations to request information within records of the federal
government, aside from a few exceptions.173 Three key exceptions deal with cybersecurity
information: information classified for national defense or foreign policy, data specifically exempt
from disclosure by a statute, and trade secrets.174 As such, FOIA’s essential purpose of assisting
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private individuals is its own downfall in trying to aid in coordination between civilian companies
and the government.175 As the government attempts to encourage the private sector to share
sensitive cybersecurity information with the federal government, the private sector becomes
increasingly concerned that their own records may become government records subject to FOIA
requests.176 A possible solution would be to not archive the information and simply treat it as
single-use by deleting the information as soon as the cyber threat has been handled, or to mark it
as classified, further supporting the need to amend the National Security Act.
American national cybersecurity is becoming more dependent upon international
partnerships as the internet becomes increasingly global.177 For example, the State Department
Basic Authorities Act of 1956 (22 U.S.C. § 2651a), an act originally intended for counterterrorism
and HIV/AIDS response coordination, contains language that under certain interpretations
provides for cybersecurity positions within the Department of State.178Additionally, the
Communications Act of 1934 (47 U.S.C. §151) grants power to the Federal Communications
Commission (FCC) to regulate domestic and international commercial communications.179 Fischer
identifies possible updates to the Act in order to respond to the current information enterprise by
saying, “the act should be revised to give the FCC more of a role in cybersecurity, especially given
the growing merging of information and communications technology (ICT) and their increasing
importance in the U.S. economy. In fact, a number of other countries have more unified
governance of ICT than the United States.”180
V. CONCLUSION
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The more one digs into cybersecurity and cyber-defense, the more questions and ambiguity
arise. The Department of Defense principally heads modern American cybersecurity operations to
ward off potential threats to the nation.181 The law regarding the use of cyber capabilities is a
mixture of attempting to adapt kinetic warfare treaties and doom-theory ideas hoping to prevent
loss of life caused by keystrokes.182 In its application of cyber capabilities, the defense apparatus
of the United States as well as our near peer rivals and competitors, is ahead in some respects but
still relies on the civilian sector for support.183 As such, legislation is trying to catch up to both
camps, the civil defense and military national defense, to properly address the needs of the nation,
both in security and their own private interest.184 The Department of Defense says it best in Joint
Publication 3-12: “Cyberspace, while part of the information environment, is dependent on the air,
land, maritime, and space physical domains,” but the corollary is likewise applicable: “air, land,
sea and space are their own environments (whether they be civilian or military) but they are all
dependent on cyber.”185
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